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I.  Introduction 
To date, the process of economic and political assimilation in the EU has been 
the most active political and regulatory response to the brave new world of global 
market integration.  It represents a zenith in policymakers’ recognition that recent 
material changes in the world economy require fundamental adjustments to the 
political structure of states.  EU Member States are the trailblazers of change and, as 
such, the manner by which they approach and resolve their integration quandaries is 
bound to reflect on future developments in the international arena. 
In this context, the EU's corporate income tax policy is particularly revealing.  
Over the last generation, the European Community and the subsequent EU have been 
remarkably successful in removing impediments to free trade among Member States.  
This resulted in an accelerated level of economic integration and allowed the 
emergence of pan-European markets and corporate structures.1  In sharp contrast to its 
ability to harmonize its monetary policy and remove trade barriers, however, the EU's 
failure to implement an effective harmonization of its Members States’ income tax 
systems is considered the Achilles heel of its strive for economic integration.2  
Although most Member States lowered their corporate tax rates and broadened their 
tax bases during the 1990's, this largely uncoordinated sequence of initiatives did not 
take the sting out of many tax barriers faced by investors in the common market.3  
                                                 
*  I wish to thank Reuven Avi-Yonah, Philip Baker, Gadi Benshalom, Michael Graetz and Tom O’Shea 
for all their help throughout the years, and, more specifically, for commenting on this paper. 
1  ROLF DIEMER & THOMAS NEALE, The European Union's Longer-Term Plans for Introducing a 
Common Consolidated Tax Base for the EU-wide Activities of Companies, 89 Cahiers de droit fiscal 
international 69, 71 (2004).  
2 WOLFGANG SCHON, The European Commission's Report on Company Taxation: A magic Formula for 
European Taxation, 42 European Taxation 276, 276 (2002) (providing an overview of the EU's failure 
in harmonizing its corporate income tax during the last 40 years). 
3 JADRANKA DJUROVIC-TODOROVIC, Corporate Income Tax in EU Countries Comparative Analysis  at 
http://facta.junis.ni.ac.yu/facta/eao/eao2002/eao2002-08.pdfxx60 
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Accordingly, some commentators consider the development of an EU (business) 
income tax policy as vital to achieving the EU's goal of economic integration.4  
The central role that taxes play in the political and economic arenas has led to 
what may be understood as a tradition of national chauvinism with regard to tax 
policy.  An attempt to overcome this legacy, by formulating an effective corporate tax 
policy, can be seen as a test of the EU's ability to attain meaningful economic 
integration.  The EU's recent enlargement, moreover, has opened a window for 
meaningful reforms in tax policy.  The need to integrate a great number of new 
Member States, some with very poor traditions of tax administration, into the EU 
market system may prove a constitutive moment.  This window of opportunity, 
however, may soon draw to a close.  Once this reconstruction momentum dies down, 
it is possible that EU tax policy will be crippled into a status quo deadlock due to 
interest group politics.5  
This Article's emphasis on the acute need for rethinking EU corporate tax 
policy justifies a greater discussion of the unique function of corporate taxation.  
Scholars widely recognize that the corporate form is the most important investment 
vehicle for transnational investments.  Corporate tax is also believed to be a 
progressive component in the finance of the state (this is especially true in the EU, 
where consumption and wage taxes comprise a significant part of the tax mix).6  The 
friction between the different roles of the corporate income tax makes it the melting 
point of income tax policy in our era.  The manner by which these inherent 
complexities are resolved in the EU in the next few years may very well impact the 
manner by which income tax policy develops in response to globalization.   
This need for reconsideration is relevant now more than ever before.  
Recently, the British government issued a detailed proposal for altering its 
international tax regime from a credit to an exemption system.7  Britain is the major 
EU economy that (still) taxes the worldwide income of its residents.  If this reform 
takes place, it can have radical consequences.  In addition, the United States is 
considering shifting to a more territorial regime and may soon follow in Britain’s 
steps.  If these two major economies were to shift to a territorial system, other 
countries are likely to soon follow, resulting in what may become a domino effect of 
territorial taxation.  Once this landslide begins, and residence taxation diminishes, 
policymakers may find that current sourcing conventions cannot bear the enormous 
pressure laid upon them to measure and tax income comprehensively.  Because the 
EU is at the forefront of contemporary sourcing debate, Member States and other 
countries will be relied upon to carefully examine for whom the EU bells would 
ring—and their future actions will be determined accordingly.   
This Article focuses on how the EU corporate tax regime should be reformed.  
It critically analyzes the current proposals for reform and offers its own alternative 
model.   
                                                 
4 The European Council set a strategic goal that the EU becomes the most competitive, dynamic and 
knowledge-based economy in the world. See Point 5 of the Presidency Conclusions from the Lisbon 
European Council, 23 and 24 March 2000. 
5  LANNOO KAREL & LEVIN MATTIAS, An EU Company Without an EU Tax? A Corporate Tax Action 
Plan for Advancing The Lisbon Process  at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/taxation_customs/taxation/company_tax/docs/conference/corporate_taxation
.pdf  xx15 
6 OECD, Revenue Statistics 1965-2005, 2006 Edition 73 (2006( 
7 HM TREASURY, Taxation of the Foreign Profits of Companies: A Discussion Document.  (2007), at 
http://www.hm-treasury.go.uk/media/E/9/consult_foreign_profits020707.pdf. 
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Part II explains the tax obstacles that the simultaneous operation of twenty-
seven tax systems imposes on attempts to make the EU economy more efficient and 
competitive.  It further outlines the EU Commission’s (hereinafter, “the 
Commission”) strategy to reduce these obstacles.  Part III provides a detailed 
description and a critical assessment of the fourth proposal, the Home State Taxation 
initiative (hereinafter, "the HST initiative"), generally considered the only proposal 
that may become operational in the foreseeable future.  This Article demonstrates why 
it should nevertheless be rejected, or limited significantly.  In Part IV, this Article 
briefly explores the Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base initiative (hereinafter 
“the CCCTB initiative”).  It concludes that while the CCCTB is better than the HST 
initiative, both proposals share some fundamental deficiencies.  There are doubts, 
however, about whether the CCCTB will become operational in the near future.  Part 
V delineates the Article’s proposal for desirable corporate income tax reform in the 
EU.  It promotes the core idea that broad incremental reforms, such as the HST, 
reduce—rather than increase—the chances of achieving overall comprehensive 
unitary reform of the entire EU corporate income tax.  Instead of advocating for these 
reforms, this Article argues that the Commission should provide one comprehensive 
unitary reform in a hard-to-tax sector, such as the financial, technology and IP-
intensive or shipping-and-aviation sectors.  Part VI compares this Article's proposal 
with the HST initiative.  Through this comparison, this Article draws out the 
principles through which a transitory regime might correspond with the long-term 





II.  The Issue in Context: The EU Corporate Tax Strategy 
A.  A Tax Perspective of Economic Integration 
Policymakers wishing to reform the EU’s corporate tax policy operate in 
difficult terrain.  International taxation is a field in which unilateralism is rarely an 
option.  A single sovereign wishing to reformulate its tax system is often required to 
embark on lengthy treaty amendment processes or be exposed to retaliation by other 
sovereigns.  Moreover, it is difficult to facilitate an effective common action with 
regard to the EU’s income tax policy.  There is a firm commitment, entrenched in the 
EU’s constitutive treaties, that any initiative related to direct taxation is to go through 
strict procedural process and must attain unanimous agreement from all Member State 
representatives in the EU Council for Economic Affairs.8  The federative nature of the 
EU seems to prescribe that Member States are to retain some control over the rates, 
subsidies and expenditures associated with the corporate tax under any future tax 
reform. 
There are two political impediments to forming a unified EU corporate tax 
policy.  First, most of the pressure for a unified EU taxation comes from the 
bureaucratic ranks of the Commission and from the judicial interpretations of EC law 
by the European Court of Justice (hereinafter, "the ECJ") rather than from the 
business community.  Lacking active business pressure and support from Member 
                                                 
8  EC treaty § 94. See generally MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & ALVIN C. WARREN JR., Income Tax 
Discrimination and the Political and Economic Integration of Europe, 115 Yale L.J. 1186, 1190-1 
(2006); CHARLES E. MCLURE, Corporate Tax Harmonization in the European Union: The 
Commission's Proposals, 36 Tax Notes Int'l 775, 781 (2004). 
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States, the Commission finds it difficult to politically mobilize such large-scaled tax 
reform.   
Second, it is difficult for Member States to align with the Commission's plans, 
since so many aspects of these plans are unclear.  While a number of objectives are 
repeatedly emphasized in all of the Commission's initiatives (e.g., enhancing 
transparency), the Commission has yet to figure out what the ultimate level of 
coordination should be and how much competition it aspires to promote.   
A situation in which twenty-seven different national corporate tax regimes 
operate simultaneously within a supposedly internal market gives rise to differential 
effective tax costs on similar commercial activities taking place within that market.  
These cost differences jeopardizes the mobility of investments within the internal 
market and conflicts with the ambition for a fully integrated and competitive market. 
The ongoing cross-border integration of markets and the enhanced mobility of 
the means of production (e.g., capital and intangible assets) intensify the threat of 
tax—as well as other types of regulatory—competition.  The existence of many 
different tax regimes allows investors to tax-shop among jurisdictions to minimize 
their tax liabilities.  Member States thus have incentives to structure their tax systems 
so as to attract certain types of investments and activities.9  The different tax costs on 
different taxpayers or economic activities are often considered to be the distortive and 
inequitable dark side of the EU's economic integration.10  Recently, this tension 
between economic integration and the sustainability of the income tax base has 
surfaced in a number of ECJ rulings.  In those rulings, the ECJ concluded that a 
number of Member States’ anti-avoidance tax regimes discriminate against foreign 
investments in a way that infringes upon the freedom of establishment.11 
 
B.  Tax Obstacles Imposed on EU Integration by the Twenty-Seven Separate 
Accounting Corporate Tax Regimes Operating Within it 
When a country employs a separate accounting tax system, it, in a sense, ring-
fences the income-producing activities taking place in its jurisdiction.  When an 
economic unit operates in multiple jurisdictions, the attempt to assign some of its 
income to a specific jurisdiction has two main implications.  First, under the separate 
accounting system, the economic activity is measured in accordance with the tax base 
and the tax accounting conventions of the jurisdiction to which it is attributed (even if 
it is conducted by a non-resident).  Second, and more importantly, the activity is 
appraised separately from related economic activities carried out by the same 
economic entity in different jurisdictions.  Accordingly, every separate accounting 
system has its own transfer pricing rules for bifurcating integrated economic activity 
                                                 
9 On this issue see HANS-GEORG PETERSEN, Globalization, Capital Flight, and Capital Income 
Taxation: A European Perspective, 33 Tax Notes Int'l 887, 888-9 (2004) (suggesting that members 
from the EU community vote with their feet and leaving the high tax jurisdictions); EU COMMISSION, 
Towards and Internal Market Without Tax Obstacles: A Strategy for Providing Companies with a 
Consolidated Corporate Tax Base for their EU-Wide Activities 7 (2001); VIERI CERIANI & SILVIA 
GIANNINI, Trends in EU Proposals on Taxation of Transnational Business Profits and Tax 
Coordination, 2003 WTD 178-11 (2003) (providing an overview over the various attempts of the EU 
to counter practices which it considered as harmful tax competition during the late 1990's); MICHAEL P. 
DEVEREUX, Issues in the  Taxation of Income from Foreign Portfolio and Direct Investment, in Taxing 
Capital Income in the European Union 224-9, (Sijbren Cnossen ed., 2000) (providing a literature 
review on the matter). 
10 ALEX ESSON, Tax Competition and Investment Incentives, 2 The EC Tax Journal 63 (1996/1997). 
11 DAVID WILLIAMS, Freedom of Establishment and Double Taxation Agreements, 19 European Law 
Review 313 (1994) (discussing a case in which the ECJ decided that the anti discrimination rationales 
have precedent over DTTs). 
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occurring in more than one jurisdiction.  Nevertheless, all jurisdictions use some form 
of the arm's-length standard to source related-party transactions.  Generally, the arm's-
length standard employs a hypothetical inquiry as to how unrelated parties would 
price a certain transaction, and requires each corporate entity within a Multinational 
Enterprise (hereinafter, “MNE”) group to report accordingly.  However, the arm's-
length standard, as it is currently enshrined in a plethora of transfer pricing 
regulations, is a conceptually flawed, practically inept, and extremely inefficient and 
burdensome mechanism to source many complex affiliated transactions.12 
Unlike confederative nations, Member States’ income tax base rules and tax 
accounting principles lack a general uniformity.  The existence of twenty-seven 
separate sets of tax-accounting rules contradicts the EU’s goal of forming an 
integrated and competitive internal market.  Furthermore, it imposes some tax-costs 
on taxpayers operating in more than one Member State, creating a bias in favor of 
domestic investment.  This set of penalties on cross-border operations creates four 
types of problems.13  First, European MNEs and tax authorities must invest 
considerable amount of resources to allocate profits and losses arising from related 
parties' transactions.  These transfer pricing costs are a major source of concern 
because the volume of affiliated transactions within integrated MNE business 
structures is only increasing.14  
Second, MNEs operating in the EU are unable to fully attain intra-group 
income tax consolidation that would be otherwise available for corporate groups with 
solely domestic operations.  This inability to consolidate losses, and the excessive 
realization of profits in cases of corporate reorganization, impose severe tax 
distortions on the efficient allocation of resources and the choice of business 
structure.15  Following the ECJ's Marks & Spencer ruling there has been some 
development in this area;16 however, MNEs are still unable to fully consolidate their 
losses. 
Third, European MNEs are forced to spend vast resources to comply with each 
domestic tax regime and its associated double taxation treaties.   
Fourth, in cases of cross-border corporate reorganizations, European MNEs 
may still incur excessive tax costs associated with the realization of profits from 
appreciated assets.   
                                                 
12  ILAN BENSHALOM, Sourcing the "Unsourceable": The Cost SharingRegulations and the Sourcing of 
Affilated-Intangible Related Transactions, 26 Va. Tax Rev. 631 (2007) (providing a critique of the 
arm’s length standard. 
13 EU COMMISSION, Company Taxation in the Internal Market SEC(2001)1681 223 (2001); SABINE D. 
SELBACH, The Harmonization of Corporate Taxation & Accounting Standards in the European 
Community and their Interrelationship, 18 Conn. J. Int'l L. 523, 528-9 (2003). 
14  EU COMMISSION, Taxation Papers: European Tax Survey 64-5 (2004); EU COMMISSION, Towards 
and Internal Market Without Tax Obstacles: A Strategy for Providing Companies with a Consolidated 
Corporate Tax Base for their EU-Wide Activities  (2001) (stressing that there is a concrete concern that 
companies which are making bona fide attempts to comply with complex and often conflicting 
transfer-pricing regimes are penalized by them); EU COMMISSION, Company Taxation in the Internal 
Market SEC(2001)1681 261-8 (2001) (mentioning that transfer-pricing was mentioned as the most 
important issue for business representatives and that due to the lack of unaffiliated transactions to 
which one may compare aggressive transfer-pricing auditing often result in double taxation on the one 
hand and manipulation on the other). 
15 EU COMMISSION, Company Taxation in the Internal Market SEC(2001)1681 249-52 (2001) 
(suggesting that there is significant evidence that the lack of consolidation results in the over taxation 
of European MNEs). 
16 ECJ, 13 December 2005, Case C-446/03, Marks & Spencer plc v. David Halsey (Her Majesty’s 
Inspector of Taxes). 
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Although the incongruence among the different tax regimes discriminately 
imposes tax-related compliance costs against international investments, it also opens a 
wide array of tax reduction opportunities for well-advised taxpayers.  Such taxpayers 
exploit inconsistencies in tax rules to engage in planning, arbitrage-seeking and 
avoidance activities.17  The different effective tax rates and deficient transfer pricing 
rules allow MNEs to shift income to low-tax jurisdictions.  Thus, as the next Part of 
this Article discusses, tax-related costs mainly affect small and medium sized 
enterprises.  These businesses bear tax costs when they expand to other Member 
States, but are unable to use rule inconsistencies to reduce their overall tax liability. 
 
 
C.  The Role of the Commission in Formulating a Tax Reform Strategy 
In a breakthrough study published in 2001,18 the Commission outlined a 
strategy to deal with the above-mentioned obstacles.  This strategy has two main 
pillars.  First, the Commission stressed the desirability of establishing a European 
corporate tax regime with a uniform consolidated tax base in which the core tax 
accounting unit is the MNE itself.19  
The second pillar relates to the Commission's strategy to relieve the tax 
obstacles it identified.  Its biggest dilemma was whether to endorse large-scale 
corporate tax reform or to support small incremental reforms.  While the payoffs of 
the former are considerably greater, its political costs are enormous.  The Commission 
proposed to deal with this problem by distinguishing between targeted and 
comprehensive remedies.20  While the first—targeted remedies—tailors a specific 
remedy for each problem, the second—comprehensive remedies—seeks to facilitate a 
major change in Member States' tax systems and to encompass a remedy for all of the 
obstacles identified in the 2001 study.  The Commission emphasized that it would 
promote both types of remedies.21 
This Article focuses on two of the targeted remedies that the Commission set 
forth—the HST initiative and, to a lesser extent, the CCCTB initiative.  In particular, 
it examines the interrelationship between the HST initiative's objectives and the 
longer-term solution of a comprehensive EU corporate tax regime. 
The Commission presented the HST and CCCTB initiatives as two of four 
alternative proposals for corporate tax consolidation.22  Even though the Commission 
presented all four as comprehensive solutions, both the HST and CCCTB initiatives 
should be regarded as (temporary) targeted solutions.  All four proposals, however, 
                                                 
17 MARTIN A. SULLIVAN, A New Era in Corporate Taxation, 41 Tax Notes Int'l 415, 416 (2006) 
(mentioning that the two main ways companies shift income is affiliated debt financing and price 
manipulation of affiliated transactions); JADRANKA DJUROVIC-TODOROVIC, Corporate Income Tax in 
EU Countries Comparative Analysis  at http://facta.junis.ni.ac.yu/facta/eao/eao2002/eao2002-08.pdf 
xx62  
18  EU COMMISSION, Company Taxation in the Internal Market SEC(2001)1681  (2001). 
19  EU COMMISSION, Towards and Internal Market Without Tax Obstacles: A Strategy for Providing 
Companies with a Consolidated Corporate Tax Base for their EU-Wide Activities 16 (2001); EU 
COMMISSION, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the 
European Economic and Social Committee: An Internal Market Without Company Tax obstacles 
Achievements, Ongoing Initiatives and Remaining Challenges 5 (2003). 
20 EU COMMISSION, Company Taxation in the Internal Market SEC(2001)1681 306 (2001). 
21 EU COMMISSION, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament 
and the European Economic and Social Committee: An Internal Market Without Company Tax 
obstacles Achievements, Ongoing Initiatives and Remaining Challenges 3 (2003( 
22 VIERI CERIANI & SILVIA GIANNINI, Trends in EU Proposals on Taxation of Transnational Business 
Profits and Tax Coordination, 2003 WTD 178-11 (2003). 
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recognize the need to create appropriation formulas to allocate the revenues of this 
newly formulated MNE tax-base among Member States.  This common thread reflects 
on the Commission’s conscious decision not to rely its long-term tax reform on arm's-
length sourcing techniques associated with separate accounting.   
The Commission has decided to promote the CCCTB initiative and has a 
formed a working group to make it operational.  However, as discussed in Part VI, 
formulating a comprehensive corporate income tax base and establishing allocation 
mechanisms that would apply to almost all EU corporations is complicated.  Reaching 
political agreement on this issue is even harder.  Thus, even though the CCCTB 
would be optional—that is, MNEs could choose whether to comply with it or with 
existing rules—the CCCTB is far from being operational.  The HST initiative is 
currently being examined in a pilot study conducted by the Commission.  The Article, 
therefore, devotes much of its analysis to describe and critically analyze it. 
 
 
III.  The HST Initiative 
Unlike the other three proposals, the HST initiative is not a purely source-
based corporate tax reform but one that involves an amalgam of source and residency 
tax-considerations.  Additionally, unlike the other three proposals, it did not originate 
from the Commission but from the joint writings of two prominent European tax 
scholars: Sven-Olof Lodin and Malcolm Gammie.23  The Commission, however, 
limited the scholars’ proposal and restricted its application only to small and medium 
business enterprises (hereinafter, SMEs). 
To fully understand the HST initiative, one must first understand the 
disproportional tax burdens faced by SMEs engaged in cross-border business 
activities.  Although SMEs comprise the spinal-column of the EU economy,24 their 
participation in cross-border activities is considerably lower than larger 
corporations,25 in part because of the grave burden imposed by tax obstacles.  SMEs 
are subject to proportionally higher tax compliance costs than large corporations.26  
They also lack the ability of larger MNEs to shift income through tax planning 
because they have lower capital reserves and access to expertise.27  Additionally, 
                                                 
23 SVEN-OLOF LODIN & MALCOLM GAMMIE, The Taxation of the European Company, 39 Euro. Tax. 
286 (1999); SVEN-OLOF LODIN & MALCOLM GAMMIE, Home State Taxation  (2000); SEVEN-OLOF 
LODIN & MALCOLM GAMMIE, Home State Taxation  at 
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/HST_book_summary.pdf 
24 EU COMMISSION, Annex to the Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European 
Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee Tackling the Corporation Tax Obstacles of Small 
and Medium-Sized Enterprises in the Internal Market – Outline of a Possible Home State Taxation 
Pilot Scheme SEC(2005) 1785 6, 15-6 (2005) (pointing out that 99% of entities I the internal market 
are SMEs and that they employ 66% of the workforce in the EU, and provides detailed figures about 
their importance to the internal market). 
25  EU COMMISSION, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament 
and the Economic and Social Committee: Tackling the Corporation Tax Obstacles of Small and 
Medium-Sized Enterprises in the Internal Market – Outline of a Possible Home State Taxation Pilot 
Scheme 3 (2005); EU COMMISSION, Annex to the Communication from the Commission to the 
Council, the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee Tackling the Corporation 
Tax Obstacles of Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises in the Internal Market – Outline of a Possible 
Home State Taxation Pilot Scheme SEC(2005) 1785 17-25 (2005). 
26 EU COMMISSION, Taxation Papers: European Tax Survey 4 & 37-8 (2004) (mentioning that 
compliance costs for medium firms is around 30% of their taxes paid, in comparison for about 2% for 
large companies, and that the compliance costs are much higher for those companies engaged in cross-
border investments). 
27  EU COMMISSION, Company Taxation in the Internal Market SEC(2001)1681 299 (2001). 
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some start-up SMEs in the technology driven sector are particularly sensitive to the 
inability to consolidate losses during the first years of operation.28  All these factors 
meaningfully hinder the integration of the internal market and its competitiveness.  
The Commission thus adopted the HST initiative to provide a remedy for the 
distortive burden placed upon SMEs that operate (or wish to operate) in more than 
one Member State.29  It was viewed as a quickly attainable and politically favorable 
remedy that did not have the agreement costs necessary for fundamental reformation 
of existing tax rules.30 
The HST initiative offers an elective system to both Member States and SMEs 
based upon the principle of mutual recognition by tax authorities.31  In Member States 
that join the HST initiative, SMEs could choose to file tax returns in their country of 
residence, under the nation’s applicable tax rules, for their operations in all of the 
participating Member States.32  Thus, under the HST initiative, affiliated cross-border 
transactions would be subject to withholding taxes.  Although the HST initiative does 
not prescribe unitary treatment of the MNE, SMEs electing to file tax returns under it 
are more likely to be residents in countries that allow group consolidation.  For this 
reason, this Article avoids discussing the unique set of problems that emerge when the 
HST initiative is implemented in unconsolidated settings.33  
Where MNEs do consolidate their profits, their net income, as computed by 
the country of residence, will be divided among the participating Member States by an 
agreed-upon payroll- and/or turnover-based appropriation formula.34  The income 
allocated to each jurisdiction will be subject to the statutory corporate tax rate 
                                                 
28  EU COMMISSION, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament 
and the Economic and Social Committee: Tackling the Corporation Tax Obstacles of Small and 
Medium-Sized Enterprises in the Internal Market – Outline of a Possible Home State Taxation Pilot 
Scheme 6 (2005); EU COMMISSION, Annex to the Communication from the Commission to the 
Council, the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee Tackling the Corporation 
Tax Obstacles of Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises in the Internal Market – Outline of a Possible 
Home State Taxation Pilot Scheme SEC(2005) 1785 29 (2005). 
29 EU COMMISSION, Outline of a Possible Experimental Application of Home State Taxation to Small 
and Medium-Sized Enterprises  (2004(. 
30  EU COMMISSION, Company Taxation in the Internal Market SEC(2001)1681 379-89 (2001).  
31  This would include the treatment of foreign income, the administration of the tax filing process, the 
definitions of income and the corporate consolidation rules. SABINE D. SELBACH, The Harmonization 
of Corporate Taxation & Accounting Standards in the European Community and their 
Interrelationship, 18 Conn. J. Int'l L. 523, 530 (2003). 
32 EU COMMISSION, Outline of a Possible Experimental Application of Home State Taxation to Small 
and Medium-Sized Enterprises  (2004); CHARLES E. MCLURE, Corporate Tax Harmonization in the 
European Union: The Commission's Proposals, 36 Tax Notes Int'l 775, 779 (2004). 
33 In those cases where the MNE subject to the HST is not consolidating profits there is an additional 
source of difficulty with the treatment of foreign income. See: CHARLES E. MCLURE, Corporate Tax 
Harmonization in the European Union: The Commission's Proposals, 36 Tax Notes Int'l 775, 793 
(2004( (pointing out that imposing the country of resident's foreign tax law on foreign subsidiaries may 
result in over or under taxation of those subsidiaries). 
34 EU COMMISSION, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament 
and the Economic and Social Committee: Tackling the Corporation Tax Obstacles of Small and 
Medium-Sized Enterprises in the Internal Market – Outline of a Possible Home State Taxation Pilot 
Scheme 23-4 (2005(. If the HST initiative adopts payroll as a sole factor, this decision may have very 
problematic implications.  Payroll does not take into account wage and consumption power 
differentiations in different countries.  Tax authorities will find it difficult to define, and consistently 
implement, a comprehensive unitary system without a careful comprehensive definition of what 
comprises an employee for unitary tax purposes. 
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applicable to that jurisdiction.  MNEs operating in sectors subject to specific tax rules 
(e.g., financial services and shipping) are excluded from the HST initiative.35  
The definition of eligibility is one attribute of the HST initiative in which the 
residence state is denied any type of discretion.  The HST initiative allows companies 
to participate in it only if they employ fewer than 250 employees, have an annual 
turnover of less than 50 million euros, or carry a balance sheet of less than 43 million 
euros.36  Furthermore, the HST initiative would be supplemented with an agreed-upon 
tie-breaker rule with regard to corporate residency determinations and a general anti-
avoidance rule that restrains the ability of participating MNEs to engage in residency-
shopping and tax-motivated expatriation.   
The revenue impact of adopting the HST initiative is not entirely clear and 
would depend upon both the formulary design and the number of Member States and 
corporations that opt to participate in it.37  It is nevertheless expected to remove tax-
induced foreign investment barriers on SMEs, in a manner that would lead to greater 
competitiveness, economic integration and welfare in the EU.38  In light of the low 
current levels of SME participation in cross-border enterprises, there seems to be 
general agreement that the ease and speed of implementing the HST initiative are its 
true virtues and that there is really little to lose by offering the HST initiative option to 
SMEs.   
The HST initiative seems to take the middle path between the Commission's 
targeted and comprehensive agendas.  It targets the SME sector and tries to 
incorporate some unitary aspects in its taxation.  Even though it incorporates these 
unitary features, the HST initiative is not perceived as a comprehensive solution, but 
rather as a remedy to the SMEs’ existing difficulty in operating within the common 
market.  This perception, in light of its middle path approach, is interesting because 
the unitary alternative is typically associated with the Commission’s ambition to 
promote a comprehensive long-term corporate tax regime rather than a targeted 
remedy.  Given this perception, this Article inquires about whether the HST initiative 
helps to promote a long-term, comprehensive EU corporate tax regime. 
This Article’s evaluation of the HST initiative distinguishes among critical 
assessments directed at the initiative’s principled decision to shift away from separate 
accounting methods towards a unitary method and explores the difficulties that are 
unique to the HST.  This Article mainly deals with the latter discussion.   
The HST initiative attempts to implant a unitary system in an international 
arena that subscribes to separate accounting norms.  Tax authorities may find it 
                                                 
35  EU COMMISSION, Outline of a Possible Experimental Application of Home State Taxation to Small 
and Medium-Sized Enterprises 5 (2004). 
36 EU COMMISSION, Home State Taxation, EU Commission.  (2006), at 
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/taxation/company_tax/home_state_taxation/index_en.htm.; EU 
COMMISSION, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the 
Economic and Social Committee: Tackling the Corporation Tax Obstacles of Small and Medium-Sized 
Enterprises in the Internal Market – Outline of a Possible Home State Taxation Pilot Scheme 14 (2005) 
37In a simulation conducted using data from SMEs in Sweden, only a slight revenue loss of revenue 
was reported, which was attributed to the (desirable) ability of SMEs to better consolidate their losses 
under the HST initiative. EU COMMISSION, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the 
European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee: Tackling the Corporation Tax 
Obstacles of Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises in the Internal Market – Outline of a Possible Home 
State Taxation Pilot Scheme 11 (2005). 
38 EU COMMISSION, Annex to the Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European 
Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee Tackling the Corporation Tax Obstacles of Small 
and Medium-Sized Enterprises in the Internal Market – Outline of a Possible Home State Taxation 
Pilot Scheme SEC(2005) 1785 55-61 (2005). 
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difficult to prevent profit-shifting and reduce administrative costs when MNEs that 
elect to consolidate under HST programs have foreign operations in non-HST 
countries.  This Article focuses on those flaws that result from the HST initiative's 
unconditional embrace of residence jurisdictions' tax bases, which is a futile attempt 
to ameliorate source taxation by highlighting the importance of tax residency.   
First, and most noticeably, the HST initiative envisions the simultaneous 
operation of multi-unitary systems (on top of the existing separate accounting 
systems).  This notion of tax-regime plurality undermines the HST initiative’s main 
objective: to reduce tax compliance and administrative costs.  For example, it would 
force parties to litigate domestic cases with reference to foreign law, involve 
complicated and arbitrary tax computation in cases of a change in corporate 
residency, and necessitate excessive cooperation among tax authorities in audits and 
investigations.39  
Second, the anti-avoidance rule suggested by the HST initiative may be 
effective in preventing direct tax-motivated corporate expatriations.  Nevertheless, it 
is unlikely to be effective with regard to newly established enterprises or corporate 
mergers and acquisitions that result in a change of corporate tax residency. 
Third, the adoption of the HST initiative may result in massive tax 
distortions.40  The HST initiative does not elaborate on how its adoption by a number 
of Member States is supposed to lead to any form of voluntary (or rapid) tax base 
convergence of their tax systems.  Without such convergence, taxpayers with similar 
economic incomes that are located in the same residence and/or source jurisdiction 
may be subject to completely different effective tax rates.41  Put differently, the HST 
is likely to perpetuate tax distortions on investments within the internal market.42  
Furthermore, the fact that corporate residency is essentially a legal fiction could help 
induce tax-base competition among states to attract companies into their 
jurisdictions.43 
Finally, it is common knowledge that electability in tax rules is a type of 
bonus for those businesses engaged with tax planners and/or tax haven jurisdictions.44  
For instance, assume there are two Member States, both of which are low tax 
jurisdictions (e.g., Ireland and Luxemburg).  One of those jurisdictions may aim to 
join the HST framework to engage in headquarter/residency tax-base competition.  
The other may elect not to participate to allow income-shifting to affiliated 
subsidiaries located in its jurisdiction.  Tax planners may choose to allocate the 
corporate residency in a country with a favorable tax base (e.g., in a country that 
                                                 
39 VIERI CERIANI & SILVIA GIANNINI, Trends in EU Proposals on Taxation of Transnational Business 
Profits and Tax Coordination, 2003 WTD 178-11 (2003); PETER BIRCH SORENSEN, Company Tax 
Reform in the European Union, 11 International Tax and Public Finance 91, 102 (2004). 
40 JOANN MARTENS WEINER & JACK MINTZ, An Exploration of Formula Approtionment in the 
European Union, 42 European Taxation 346, 348 (2002). 
41This differentiation of effective tax rates, especially on the source jurisdiction, may put in question 
the political viability of the proposal. BJORN WESTBERG, Consolidated Corporate Tax Bases for EU 
wide Activities: Evaluation of four Proposals Presented by the European Commission, see id. at 322  
Xx333; CHARLES E. MCLURE, Corporate Tax Harmonization in the European Union: The 
Commission's Proposals, 36 Tax Notes Int'l 775, 788-9 (2004). 
42 VIERI CERIANI & SILVIA GIANNINI, Trends in EU Proposals on Taxation of Transnational Business 
Profits and Tax Coordination, 2003 WTD 178-11 (2003). 
43 SABINE D. SELBACH, The Harmonization of Corporate Taxation & Accounting Standards in the 
European Community and their Interrelationship, 18 Conn. J. Int'l L. 523, 537 (2003). 
44 BJORN WESTBERG, Consolidated Corporate Tax Bases for EU wide Activities: Evaluation of four 
Proposals Presented by the European Commission, 42 European Taxation 322, 330 (2002) (pointing 
that by definition elective regimes invites planning). 
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exempts foreign income and employs relatively lax transfer-pricing rules, has a 
favorable treaty network, calculates depreciation at accelerated rates, etc.).  This could 
be done simultaneously with the shifting of income (through “traditional” debt 
financing and transfer-pricing loopholes) to a subsidiary located in another low-tax 
jurisdiction that is not participating in the HST arrangement.  If this subsidiary is a 
resident of a Member State, it would enjoy the protections of the EU parent, as well 
as, the interest and royalties directives that the parent benefits from.  While general 
anti-avoidance rules may be useful to circumvent bluntly artificial transactions, 
careful tax planning would put most of these structures within the gray area that is 
beyond the effective reach of these rules. 
The assumption that the revenue impact of the HST initiative will be minimal 
should be reconsidered.  Member States with high-tax jurisdictions that will take part 
in the HST initiative may have their corporate tax base significantly stripped.  
Through simple tax planning, SMEs would be able to reduce their taxable earnings in 
jurisdictions with high corporate taxes, even though those high-tax jurisdictions will 
still enjoy the privilege of imposing their relatively high statutory tax rates. 
To conclude, the Commission's decision to promote the political feasibility of 
the HST initiative came at the cost of conceding the legitimacy of some of its flaws.  
Allowing the barbarians within its walls, the HST initiative may result in severe 
revenue loss and fail to relieve tax compliance and administrative burdens.  Moreover, 
if adopted, the HST initiative may actually jeopardize the EU’s progress toward 
adopting a comprehensive unitary tax system.  Its flaws may erode the political 
legitimacy for a unitary solution and consume too much of the Commission's tax 
expertise.  The HST initiative’s wide array of distortions will provide incentives to 
form taxpayers' lobbies, making it difficult for the Commission to advance the 
solution of a comprehensive unitary system.  Because of these flaws, the HST 
initiative is indefensible in its current format. 
For the HST initiative to be justified, the Commission must significantly lower 
its costs by limiting the HST regime to small businesses.  The HST solution is 
suitable for cases where a coffee-shop owner in Baarle-Hertog (Belgium) wishes to 
open a coffee shop across the street in Baarle-Nassau (Netherlands).  Because of its 
abuse potential, the HST initiative is not suitable for businesses of a larger scale.  A 
start-up company that subscribes to the HST initiative, while being a resident of 
Luxemburg but operating a research center in Germany and a production line in 
France, may cost the treasuries of France and Germany a lot of revenue.  Since the 
HST initiative offers a transitory solution, its negative impact on the chances of 




IV.  The CCCTB Initiative 
Under the CCCTB initiative, Member States would allow MNEs within them 
to elect whether to report all of their operations under a single, consolidated, EU 
corporate tax base.  The initiative does not require MNEs to make the election, and 
they can choose to continue using the twenty-seven separate accounting systems 
instead.  The net income of the group would be allocated by an appropriation formula.  
MNEs participating in the CCCTB may choose to give up the tax benefits of shifting 
income in return for the ability to consolidate their losses and relieve their transfer-
pricing compliance burden.  The Commission has considered recently tying a tax 
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reform similar to the CCCTB to its European company (the Societas Europaea) 
initiative.45  
The other two comprehensive proposals advocated by the Commission’s 2001 
study are basically stricter mandatory versions of the CCCTB.46  The adoption of 
these stricter versions would remove tax-obstacles on economic integration more 
effectively than the CCCTB.  However, because they are mandatory, they require 
profound levels of harmonization and cooperation. Therefore, these two more 
comprehensive proposals are unlikely to gain Member States’ support in the current 
political atmosphere.  Although both proposals provide Member States with tax rate 
flexibility, Member States are unlikely to agree to completely harmonize their tax 
bases.  
The CCCTB initiative is operational because of its optional nature.  
Consequently, however, it suffers from this fundamental weakness; it tries to 
simultaneously advance both tax uniformity and the taxpayers’ choice to elect 
whether they want to be subject to it.  Accordingly it has two main draw backs: First, 
it requires intensive cooperation and agreement among Member States that desire to 
offer such uniformity.  Even on the most superficial level, one has to recognize that 
formulating an all-encompassing corporate tax base involves a lot of difficult-to-
agree-upon technical aspects.47  Many of the difficulties are not merely technical, but 
also represent deeply rooted ideological tax policy divisions.  It is therefore difficult 
to see how Member States could reconcile many of the issues that this type of 
corporate-base formulation raises in the near future.48  Moreover, like the other 
                                                 
45 The Commission’s idea was that the Societas Europaea may be used as a platform for adopting a 
consolidated common European tax base. This consolidated tax base is supposed to be both a pilot for a 
European corporate tax system and an incentive to lure European companies to incorporate under the 
new status. However, since this initiative is still in very inchoate and preliminary stages the Article 
refrains from addressing it in length. See  MALCOLM GAMMIE, EU Taxation and the Societas Europaea 
- Harmless creature or Trojan Horse?, 44 see id. at 3, 37-9 (2004(; EU COMMISSION, Communication 
from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the European Economic and Social 
Committee: An Internal Market Without Company Tax obstacles Achievements, Ongoing Initiatives 
and Remaining Challenges 24 (2003). 
46 Both are mandatory and require broader base harmonization. Like the CCTB, both would allow 
cross-border loss consolidation, and thus would require an agreed upon allocation formula. The 
European Union corporate income tax (hereinafter, "the EUCIT") proposal would impose a corporate 
tax on the EU rather than the national level. This would eliminate the need for existing national tax 
bases. The new corporate tax would be administrated and collected by an EU organ and not by Member 
States. The more radical version of this proposal would also require a uniform tax rate. The other 
proposal, known as the Harmonized Tax Base (hereinafter, "the HTB") would apply to all business 
enterprises. Under this proposal, each Member State would determine its tax rates and administrate the 
tax. However, unlike the EUCIT proposal, the HTB proposal does not require any central European tax 
administration. 
47 EU COMMISSION, Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base Working Group (CCCTB WG) 
Progress to Date and Future Plans for the CCCTB 15 (2006( (mentioning that the working groups did 
not discuss the treatment of intra-group dividend payments); EU COMMISSION, Communication from 
the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social 
Committee: Implementing the Community Lisbon Programme: Progress to Date and Next Steps 
Towards a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) 8, 11 (2006) (mentioning that experts 
from different countries seem to prefer what they know and an annex showing the initial stages of the 
discussions on virtually all topics); EU COMMISSION, Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base 
Working Group (CCCTB WG) - CCCTB: Possible Elements of a Technical Outline  (2007) (giving a 
broad overview of all the issues the CCCTB requires to settle and demonstrating the complexity of the 
matters at stake). 
48 EU COMMISSION, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council 
and the European Economic and Social Committee: Implementing the Community Program for 
Improved Growth and Employment and he Enhanced Competitiveness of EU Business :Further 
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proposals, the CCCTB requires devising a formulary allocation mechanism that is 
very different from the arm’s-length transfer pricing regimes that Member States’ 
currently employ.  The Commission (justly) regards the ability to consolidate losses 
as one of the CCCTB initiative’s main benefits.  This loss consolidation is not 
possible without an allocation mechanism.  Because the CCCTB would apply to 
almost all types of EU companies, the revenue impact of these decisions would be 
immense.  Member States will find it difficult to reach agreements on these issues, 
given the high stakes involved.49   
Second, taxpayers can elect whether they are subject to the CCCTB, which 
means that, even if it is adopted by the Commission, multiple tax systems would still 
operate simultaneously.  As in the case of the HST initiative, this means that neither 
the administrative and compliance costs, nor the concerns over tax avoidance are 
likely to be significantly reduced by the CCCTB initiative.  MNEs tend to be 
sophisticated and well-advised taxpayers that do not mind spending resources on tax 
planning if they perceive them as worthy investments.  Therefore, it seems naïve to 
think that MNES would elect the CCCTB unless it reduces their overall costs.  
Although adopting the CCCTB would reduce their compliance costs, to the extent that 
it would increase their effective tax rate, they would not choose it.  The CCCTB may 
indeed raise the effective tax rate if it succeeds in meeting the Commission’s 
objectives of limiting MNEs planning and income-shifting possibilities and 
broadening the corporate tax base.50   
This fundamental inconsistency in the CCCTB limits its potential advantages 
and reduces its feasibility.  Therefore, this Article believes that the CCCTB, currently, 
has limited prospects in forwarding the Commission’s integration objectives.  
Accordingly, the rest of this discussion focuses on comparing this Article's proposal 
with the HST initiative.  As elaborated in the previous Part, the agreement costs for 
the HST initiative are low.  This explains why the Commission regards "the concept 
                                                                                                                                            
Progress during 2006 and next steps towards a proposal on the Common Consolidated Corporate Tax 
Base (CCCTB) 6-7 (2007( (discussing the difficulty in reconciling different tax preferences of Member 
States and in determining and administrative framework for the proposal); EU COMMISSION, Common 
Consolidated Corporate Tax Base Working Group (CCCTB WG) Progress to Date and Future Plans for 
the CCCTB 16 (2006). 
49 This part of the CCTB project is in its very early stages. See EU COMMISSION, Common 
Consolidated Corporate Tax Base Working Group (CCCTB WG) Progress to Date and Future Plans for 
the CCCTB 18 (2006); EU COMMISSION, Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social Committee: Implementing the 
Community Lisbon Programme: Progress to Date and Next Steps Towards a Common Consolidated 
Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) 6 (2006); EU COMMISSION, Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base 
Working Group (CCCTB WG) Report and Overview of the Main Issues that Emerged During the 
Discussion on the Sharing Mechanism SG6 second meeting – 11 June 2007  at 
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/taxation/company_tax/common_tax_base/C
CCTBWP056_en.pdf (stressing out the different problems and considerations that should be taking into 
account when adopting sharing mechanisms). 
50 The Commission wishes to promote a broad CCCTB tax base. EU COMMISSION, Communication 
from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social 
Committee: Implementing the Community Program for Improved Growth and Employment and he 
Enhanced Competitiveness of EU Business: Further Progress during 2006 and next steps towards a 
proposal on the Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) 6 (2007) . Member States will 
impose their corporate tax rates on corporations that chose to file under the CCCTB. If the CCCTB tax 
rate is indeed broader than the one of most Member States the effective tax rate of MNEs may increase 
unless Member States provide CCCTB filers with a special reduced tax rate.   
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of Home State Taxation… to be a very promising way of tackling the tax problems 
that hamper SMEs when they are expanding across borders."51 
 
 
V.  The Article’s Proposal: Unitary and Formulary Taxing of the Hard-to-Tax 
This Article portrays a different strategy that the Commission should promote 
in its efforts to attain its goals of a European corporate tax regime that includes a 
harmonized base, loss consolidation, and unitary tax-allocation methodology.  It 
suggests doing so by providing a comprehensive solution to a targeted problem.  
Unlike the Commission’s comprehensive solution, this Article's solution entails a 
reformulation of how a specific sector or activity should be taxed through a formulary 
or unitary system.  The limited scope of this Article’s reformulation is intended to 
make its proposal more politically feasible.  It suggests that the Commission should 
employ a mandatory, unitary sourcing regime on one of the hard-to-tax-sectors as a 
pilot for a comprehensive unitary solution. This strategy would allow the Commission 
and Member States to gradually implement the European unitary solution and to avoid 
the unpredictable groundswell of radical reform.  While this Article does not pretend 
to offer any spotless textbook solutions, it opts to propose a politically feasible 
strategy, which, unlike the HST and CCCTB initiatives, would be able to get a 
foothold on the path toward a comprehensive unitary solution. 
Current separate accounting and sourcing arrangements fail because they 
attempt to trace and assign ownership of mobile assets to specific corporate entities 
and jurisdictions.  This is an attempt to adhere to obsolete legal forms, which are alien 
to the business models that it is supposed to tax.  In economic reality, where MNEs 
share risks and interests with respect to the mobile assets they hold, create, and utilize, 
endorsing specific corporate ownership—rather than MNE ownership—of financial 
and intangible assets would be both obsolete and hazardous.52  Such an endorsement 
allows MNEs to utilize their current exceptional capacity to exploit the international 
tax system.  This, in turn, amplifies the demand for tax-competitive behaviors from 
sovereigns and promotes tax base erosion. 
As a response to these concerns, this Article argues for a dual sourcing regime.  
The cornerstones of this regime are the following: (1) every type of tangible 
transaction (or function) for which a reasonable market comparable exists should be 
sourced in accordance with the arm’s-length standard (as previously suggested, 
preferably according to the CPM method); (2) other types of transaction or functions 
(e.g., intangibles-related transactions; transaction involving mobile and easy-to-
manipulate MNE resources, such as financial resources) should be sourced according 
to formulary methods that rely on immobile indicators.  The underlying theme of both 
cornerstones is that sourcing should be done by a standardized proxy.  This proxy 
should be determined according to tangible indicators that demonstrate where MNE 
activities are taking place, thus indicating where their profits have been generated.  
Although sourcing by such immobile proxies certainly raises some obvious concerns, 
                                                 
51  EU COMMISSION, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament 
and the Economic and Social Committee: Tackling the Corporation Tax Obstacles of Small and 
Medium-Sized Enterprises in the Internal Market – Outline of a Possible Home State Taxation Pilot 
Scheme 8, 11 (2005);EU COMMISSION, Home State Taxation, EU Commission.  (2006), at 
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/taxation/company_tax/home_state_taxation/index_en.htm. 
52 Elizabeth Chorvat, Forcing Multinationals to Play Fair: Proposals for a Rigorous Transfer Pricing 
Theory, 54 ALABAMA L. REV 1251 (2003) (conveying a different opinion that tax authorities could use 
advanced risk assessment methods to breakdown the intra-MNE capital formation and risk allocation).  
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it would perform better than the present system in halting MNEs’ ability to shift 
income.     
In two earlier Articles, I developed the idea of a dual sourcing regime that 
prescribed formulary sourcing of the income MNEs derive from financial and 
intangible-related transactions.  More specifically, I argued that for MNEs operating 
in the financial sector (hereinafter FMNEs), there is good reason to switch to a full-
scale unitary system.  The reason is that FMNE income is comprised almost entirely 
of income related to financial activities.  Because financial activities and assets are 
mobile and tax sensitive, the arm’s-length transfer-pricing paradigm simply falls apart 
when implemented on these financial Goliaths.  Tax authorities simply do not have 
sufficient resources to effectively audit the huge volume of sophisticated affiliated 
FMNE transactions in according to the arm’s-length standard.  Moreover, in the case 
of financial transactions, tax authorities also lack a conceptual paradigm to determine 
what an arm’s-length standard is.  Financial engineering allows these well-advised 
taxpayers to construct their capital flows through an infinite number of instruments.  
Thus, economically similar positions may have completely different tax consequences 
when carried through different financial instruments.   
This Article argues that the Commission should adopt a comprehensive FMNE 
unitary system or any other comprehensive system that would unitarily source a hard-
to-tax-sector as the first strategic step of reforming the EU corporate tax.  Under the 
FMNE unitary system, FMNE earnings would be allocated according to the volume 
of economic activity they have in each jurisdiction.  This volume would be 
determined according to two factors: tangible property and compensation for labor.  
Both these factors are immobile and relatively easy for tax authorities to assess.53 
This Article does not wish to pretend that this unitary sourcing solution, as any 
other unitary sourcing solution, is a simple one.  It does not discuss the proposal itself 
with great detail, but rather highlights the key issues that are relevant in the EU 
context.  This Article’s unitary proposal strives for uniformity in all key elements 
other than tax rates.54  Therefore, the unitary system would have to operate under a 
single set of uniform rules that determine the scope of the income tax base, the tax 
accounting rules that define the appropriation formula factors, and the composition of 
the formula.  More importantly, the unitary system should be administrated by a 
centralized agency, probably a branch of the Commission, which would be 
responsible for its coherent and transparent implementation.  For the purposes of this 
Article, it is not necessary to elaborate upon the precise set of rules that would 
comprise the income tax base and tax accounting conventions.  Almost any uniform 
set of reasonable and broad-base rules would involve fewer compliance costs and 
abuse possibilities than the twenty-seven sets of tax rules currently employed.  The 
political costs of agreement required by such uniformity are discussed in the next Part.   
A number of problems may result from attempting to implement a unitary 
solution in an insufficiently integrated political setting.  First, and most notably, the 
emphasis of the suggested formula on labor compensation as a benchmark for 
sourcing is problematic due to the different wage structures in various Member States.  
To actively promote such a proposal, the Commission has to control for the different 
                                                 
53 ILAN BENSHALOM, The Quest to Tax Financial Income in a Global Economy: Emerging to an 
Allocation Phase Va. Tax Rev.  (forthcomming, 2008) (elaborating on this proposal in great details).  
54CHARLES E. MCLURE, Replacing Separate Entity Accounting and the Arm's Length Standard with 
Formulary Apportionment, 56 Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation 586, 598 (2002(. 
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costs of living and the different price levels in different Member States.55  This would 
provide incentives for the new (and poorer) Member States to support the proposal.  
The proposal’s emphasis on the importance of the payroll factor also poses significant 
political problems, because tying the sourcing of FMNEs to the payroll imposes an 
implicit tax on labor.  Given the high unemployment rates in many Member States, it 
would be difficult for the Commission to persuade them to impose such a tax.   
Second, another source of difficulty with this Article's proposal is its attempt 
to place a multinational unitary system within an international tax regime based on a 
decentralized network of bilateral tax treaties.56  These treaties subscribe to a number 
of soft-law principles that adhere to the concepts of separate tax accounting and 
arm’s-length sourcing.  The vast majority of FMNEs in question would have non-
European branches and subsidiaries.  In the absence of an agreement on the 
international level, the transactions affiliated with these branches and subsidiaries 
would be sourced by traditional separate accounting mechanisms.  This would require 
the FMNE taxing authority to employ a single set of transfer pricing rules to source 
these transactions.  The unitary rules would also have to include a set of uniform CFC 
and thin capitalization provisions.   
Under the unitary system, internal flows of capital resources within the 
European components of the FMNEs would be completely flexible and free of tax 
costs.  If one assumes that no single set of withholding taxes could be attained 
(because of Member States' double taxation treaty obligations with third countries), it 
is crucial to develop some mechanism of sourcing foreign operations to avoid severe 
problems of treaty shopping.57  This requires the Commission to implement some 
                                                 
55 KATHLEEN MATTHEWS, U.S. and Canadian Officials Discuss APAs in the Global Trading Context; 
Advance Pricing Agreements, 8 Tax Notes International 1362, 1363 (1994). 
56 VICTOR ZONANA, International Tax Policy in the New Millennium: Developing an Agenda, 26 
Brooklyn J. Int'l L. 1253, 1254 (2001).  There are a number of alternative approaches to this problem. 
A first approach will allow this jurisdictional shopping. This approach may open a too wide of a 
planning hole in many of the Member States' tax systems. This in turn could endanger the integrity of 
the unitary system. A second approach would determine a quasi corporate residency rule and attribute 
all the foreign transactions for withholding tax purposes to it. Although this may seem as an easy and 
practical solution, its clinging to the residency benchmark is wasteful and antithetical to the enterprise 
of formulating a unitary system and thus it should be rejected. A third approach would attribute 
FMNEs foreign related activities according to a formula. Under this approach, the volume of foreign 
transactions that would be attributed to each of the FMNEs' jurisdiction would be determined in 
accordance with the relative level of activity in that geographic location. The level of activity will be 
determined in accordance with the relative income share of each jurisdiction. For example, assume a 
European FMNE, operating in the UK and Germany. In a given fiscal year (any type of time 
framework could be used for this purpose) 70% of the FMNEs income was attributed to the UK and 
30% to Germany. During that year it paid 1000 euros as dividends to its American Parent. In this 
scenario the amount of dividend attributed to the UK and Germany for withholding tax purposes would 
be 700 and 300 euros, respectively. Albeit this solution is feasible, it does require separate accounting 
for different types of foreign transactions. This sheds a shadow of doubt whether the Article's proposal 
would succeed in attaining its ambitions of compliance burden reduction and simplification. The 
answer to this question is a factual one, which largely depends on the relative weight of EU 
transactions v. foreign transactions in European FMNEs activities. It is nevertheless crucial to 
recognize that under the current separate accounting systems, taxpayers are not only require to hold 
separate accounting methods for financial transactions within Europe but also have to deal with twenty-
seven different rules of how to keep those accounts. 
57 For instance, assume an FMNE operating in the UK, France, the Netherlands and Germany. Further 
assume that this FMNE wishes to conduct business with an affiliated (or non-affiliated) company in a 
non EU tax haven jurisdiction, which has a favorable tax treaty with the Netherlands. In a unitary 
setting, there is basically nothing to prevent it from channeling many of its transactions through the 
Netherlands to obtain the most tax efficient results. 
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type of anti-avoidance rule.58  However, even if the Commission does not advance 
such a rule, the proposal will still be valid because it is not supposed to provide a 
flawless alternative but rather only a better one.  Since the current anti-treaty sh
arrangements are by and large ineffective, FMNEs already freely channel their 
financial flows to attain the best available withholding tax treatment.   
opping 
                                                
The EU has a long history of tax competition with regard to financial 
activities.59  The Commission's earliest initiatives recognized that tax differentiation 
in the effective taxation of financial intermediaries is one of the biggest tax obstacles 
in preventing a liberalized and efficient allocation of capital.60  If subject to a 
harmonized tax system free of cross-border obstacles, European capital markets will 
become more centralized in their management, more flexible in the way they allocate 
their resources, and more competitive.  By that same token, if nothing changes, it is 
also clear that as the economic integration of European financial markets advances, 
EU taxpayers and tax-authorities will witness a growth in compliance, administrative, 
planning and avoidance costs—all of which are costs inherent to maintaining twenty-
seven different tax systems.  The financial sector is unique because it deals solely 
with mobile intangible assets.  Furthermore, financial engineering allows taxpayers to 
reach equivalent economic positions through different types of legal contracts. 
Therefore, in many cases these assets do not have market comparables because there 
is no one correct way of structuring financial transactions.  While taxing FMNEs 
through a unitary setting is by no means a panacea, it over-performs the current use of 
twenty-seven separate accounting regimes to source FMNEs.  The growth in the 
volume of FMNE affiliated financial transactions and their complexity, the 
anticipated growth of the FMNE business sector, the significant deadweight of the 
international transfer-pricing regime, and the current inequities in the distribution of 
revenue all indicate that adopting the Article’s suggested unitary reform is worth its 
transition and uncertainty costs.  This conclusion resonates with the growing 
recognition of both policymakers and members of the financial industry that any EU 





VI.  General Attributes of the EU Strategy Towards Implementing Unitary Taxation 
 
The Commission has embraced the first few steps on the long road towards 
unitary taxation.  Most importantly, it recognized the arm’s-length standard's limited 
prospects and the need to shift its tax policy emphasis from problems of harmful tax 
competition and adequate pricing methodologies to the core problems of revenue 
allocation within an integrated market.  This Article does not wish to open an in-depth 
discussion of the well known unitary v. arm’s-length debate.  It does, nevertheless, 
 
58 To be effective this rule would require another formula that would allocate FMNEs foreign 
transactions between the different Member States in which they are operating.  
59  In 1992 the Commission's Ruding Report mentioned that most of the harmful tax competitive 
schemes introduced by Member States were designed to attract internationally mobile business 
particularly in the financial sector. See: Miranda Stewart, Commentary, 54 Tax L. Rev. 111 (2000). 
60 ALEX EASSON, Harmonization of Direct Taxation in the EC, 40 Canadian Tax Review 600, 604-5 
(1992). 
61 EU COMMISSION, Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base Working Group (CCCTB WG) 
Progress to Date and Future Plans for the CCCTB 9-10 (2006(. 
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wish to engage in a meaningful discussion regarding the strategy of attaining a 
comprehensive unitary EU corporate tax regime.   
In an attempt to elicit the principles necessary to attain unitary reform in the 
EU, this Part compares the proposal of the HST initiative with that advocated by this 
Article.  Both proposals share some common features.  First, both depart from the 
traditional wisdom of international tax law policymaking.  Rather than refining highly 
factitious ad hoc pricing mechanisms, such as the APA arrangements and the profit-
split transfer-pricing methodologies, both proposals seek to provide a unitary default 
rule targeting affiliated-transaction sourcing hurdles.   
Second, each proposal applies only to a relatively small, yet significant, sector.  
By limiting their scope, the proposals bypass the problem inherent to the CCCTB 
initiative, which requires policymakers to agree upon an inclusive corporate income 
tax base and formula.  This limited nature of the Article’s proposal and the HST 
initiative seems necessary to avoid the conceptual difficulty of writing a new 
corporate income tax base.  More importantly, this limited nature enhances the 
political feasibility of the proposals and allows both proposals to avoid the potential 
groundswell of overall corporate tax reform.  The sectors on which the two proposals 
focus are similar, in the sense that the separate accounting systems contained in each 
leads to grave (albeit different) fallouts.   
Third, both proposals promote efficiency in their respective sectors, since they 
reduce problems of double taxation and tax distortions associated with MNEs 
organizational and finance structures.   
Fourth, both proposals reduce (but not eliminate) the compliance and 
administration problems associated with transfer pricing and thin capitalization.   
Fifth, by employing a consolidated tax base along with a unitary allocation 
system, both proposals reduce biases against foreign investments.  By doing so, both 
proposals highlight the connection between the unitary solution and the removal of 
tax obstacles slowing European market integration.   
Finally, the problems both proposals entail can be traced to a similar source: 
the attempt to insulate a certain unitary activity in an arm’s-length world.   
The most fundamental difference between the proposals is the tradeoff they 
make with regard to the costs of the political agreements necessary for a smoothly 
functioning unitary system.  The proponents of the HST initiative choose to avoid 
these costs by allowing multiple unitary systems to coexist and by making the 
proposed regime electable.  In contrast, the Article's proposal emphasizes the need for 
a uniform mandatory regime, which entails significant costs for formulating a single 
FMNE income tax base, uniform tax accounting principles and, most importantly, a 
single European FMNE tax administration.   
When evaluating the two proposals, it is important to recognize that both offer 
some type of transitional tax regime.  This point suggests that the proposals should be 
primarily evaluated in terms of how well they promote the Commission's final goals.  
This Part's analysis explores whether the enhanced agreement costs required by this 
Article's proposals are indeed an investment worth making.   
This point should be answered on a number of different layers, according to 
the different evaluation criteria for multinational tax reform. 
A.  Compliance costs—Although having a single unitary tax is beneficial for a 
great number of reasons, the primary benchmark for its success is its ability to reduce 
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compliance and administrative costs.62  Any departure from the status-quo entails a 
set of potential losers.  Accordingly, it is important that the proposed unitary change 
reduces all parties' compliance and administrative burdens.  This type of Pareto 
improvement in compliance and administrative cost reduction is the main guarantee 
for the reform’s viability.  On these terms, this Article’s proposal is more successful, 
because it provides a uniform and therefore easier tax regime to administrate and with 
which to comply.63 
B.  Fiscal viability—Another benchmark by which the proposals should be 
evaluated is their ability to provide solid revenue grounds in an era of tax competition 
and exceeding fiscal obligations.  In this respect, it is worth noting that both proposals 
could increase tax competition tendencies.  Unitary taxation essentially is a territorial 
system, which taxes business profits only once at the source.  Thus, implementing it 
without any type of tax-rate coordination increases the risk of a tax-competitive race 
to the bottom among Member States seeking to attract investments by reducing 
corporate tax rates and increasing cash/tax subsidies.64  However, the adoption of the 
HST initiative jeopardizes a different sort of tax-base competition.  The tax-base 
competition under the HST initiative would allow Member States, which seek to 
attract corporate headquarters to their jurisdictions by narrowing corporate tax bases, 
to reduce the effective tax rates of other Member States by exporting their own tax 
advantages.65  This type of competition is arguably more pernicious since it is less 
transparent, and thus requires less political accountability.66  Furthermore, the 
electability of the HST initiative is in many senses a license for tax avoidance.  The 
enhanced friction points among its different systems enable SMEs to engage in tax 
planning and to seek tax arbitrage.  In contrast, this Article's proposal offers a more 
sensible method of allocation under which the effective tax rate in each jurisdiction is 
determined by the level of economic activity in a respective location, and not by the 
country of its corporate residence. 
C.  Learning externalities—Both proposals aim to initiate a wider process of 
unitary corporate taxation in the EU.  Thus, the Article assesses both proposals with 
respect to the institutional knowledge the Commission is expected to gain from their 
implementation.  The HST is fundamentally different from any comprehensive 
unitary corporate tax solution the Commission may seek to promote, so there is little 
operational knowledge that could be gained by facilitating it.  In sharp contrast, this 
Article's proposal offers a longstanding solution to the problem associated with 
sourcing FMNE affiliated transactions.  If a comprehensive EU unitary solution is 
eventually established, industries with unique characteristics, such as the financial 
sector, may still require a unique formula.67  Thus, the political and administrative 
                                                 
62 JACK MINTZ, Corporate Tax Harmonization in Europe: It's All About Compliance, 11 International 
Tax and Public Finance 221, 221 (2004). 
63  Id. at 231.  (pointing that electability of a tax regime is antithetical with the ambition to reduce tax 
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64 VIERI CERIANI & SILVIA GIANNINI, Trends in EU Proposals on Taxation of Transnational Business 
Profits and Tax Coordination, 2003 WTD 178-11 (2003) (discussing the importance of tax rate 
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65 WOLFGANG SCHON, The European Commission's Report on Company Taxation: A magic Formula 
for European Taxation, 42 European Taxation 276, 285 (2002). 
66 Id. at 285.   
67 CHARLES E. MCLURE, Deciding Whether the European Union should Adopt Formula Apportionment 
of Company Income, in Taxing Capital Income in the European Union 259, (Sijbren Cnossen ed., 
2000). 
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resources invested in promoting this Article's proposal will not be in vain once the 
Commission begins mobilizing the process of attaining a more comprehensive 
solution.  More significantly, the proposal provides the Commission and Member 
State tax authorities with the necessary institutional knowledge to combat the 
difficulties of delineating and operating a unitary system.  Implementing the unitary 
sourcing solution in the limited financial sector setting will allow tax policymakers to 
control the transition costs of shifting to a unitary system.  Accordingly, the costs of 
establishing the uniformity required under this Article's proposal should be seen as an 
investment towards future benefits in the pursuit for a comprehensive tax solution. 
D.  Political learning—The institutional experience of having a centralized 
FMNE tax authority is crucial.  Most tax disputes involve a national tax authority and 
a taxpayer.  However, in the context of this Article’s discussion, tax disputes are most 
likely to arise among tax authorities.  In light of this insight, policymakers should 
remember that the adoption of the HST initiative would create a cleft in Member 
States’ tax systems.  This Article's proposal helps promote the idea that no cross-
border European tax reform is possible so long as Member States are not willing to 
reform their own tax systems.68  This Article's proposal prevails over the HST 
initiative because Member States need to internalize the need for a centralized 
authority, rather than mutual recognition of one another’s tax systems, to remove tax 
obstacles.  It also promotes a more transparent multinational tax regime that would 
enhance political accountability (of the Commission, Member States, and lobbying 
groups) to delineating tax policy.  This would require tax authorities to address the 
revenue and distributive impacts of having a unitary system.  The FMNE unitary 
system is an avenue by which the EU could address these issues, which are likely to 
play a vital role in its attempts to self determine its profile as a political entity.   
E.  National fiscal sovereignty—One of the core obstacles in the 
implementation of an EU unitary system is the intuitive link Member States make 
between national fiscal sovereignty and separate accounting systems.  This, of course, 
is an illusion.  This conception of fiscal sovereignty is very formalistic, and therefore 
inconsistent, with the notion of substantive fiscal sovereignty in an internal market.69  
In reality, Member State tax regimes intertwine so intimately that their tax policy 
decisions are unquestionably dependent on each other.70  Through coordination, states 
can sustain a reasonable and reliable flow of revenues.  This would enable them to 
achieve a higher level of control in developing more equitable public-financing 
systems and governmental expenditure schemes.71  In contrast, when divided, 
Members States are ruled by the prisoner's dilemma and coerced to subordinate their 
national fiscal considerations to global market forces.72  Both the HST and this 
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Article's proposals threaten the myth that separate accounting promotes fiscal 
sovereignty.73  However, the HST initiative is in many senses a double-edge sword.  
On the one hand, it allows Member States to maintain their autonomy with respect to 
their ability to shape their own tax bases.  On the other hand, the HST initiative 
reduces the actual ability of Member States to exercise control over the taxation of 
commercial activities in their own source jurisdiction.  Moreover, sovereign power to 
tax is lost in favor of other unaccountable political processes taking place in other 
Member States.  Consider the following example.  [A] is a Member State that elects to 
participate in the HST regime.  [A], which has a service-driven economy, implements 
accelerated depreciation rules for heavy machinery.  The major impact of these rules 
would be borne by Member States with industry-driven economies participating in the 
HST regime.  Corporate residents of country [A] may elect to file tax returns using the 
benefits of these accelerated depreciation rates in other source jurisdictions.  This 
Article's proposal grants each Member State the ability to participate in the political 
process that generates the tax rules to which it would be subjected under the proposal.  
Just like any other type of common action, this type of subordination to a decision-
making process is the only avenue open to Member States to enhance their 




VII.  Conclusions 
The EU tax policy is at a crossroad where it has to decide whether to take the 
path of integration.74  This Article suggests that although the Commission has 
promulgated its endorsement of corporate income tax integration, the initiatives it 
took, namely the HST initiative, show that this endorsement was half-hearted at the 
very best.   
We are living in an age in which the power of domestic tax authorities have 
become considerably smaller than the scope of the transactions, income-producing 
activities, institutions, and markets that these tax-authorities are supposed to 
efficiently and equitably tax.  The CCCTB initiative entrenches and the HST initiative 
even enhances the difference among various EU tax regimes.  This Article’s proposal 
promotes targeted comprehensive reform in one of the hard-to-tax sectors, such as the 
financial sector.  This is a politically feasible strategy that allows the EU to start the 
process of converging the different European tax regimes into a single EU corporate 
income tax regime. 
There is an old Hasidic fable about an ageing father who had two sons.  He did 
not know which one of them should take his place in managing the family farm and 
decided to test them by giving them a task.  He showed each of them a different parcel 
of land which had one large boulder in it and a lot of small rocks.  He told them that 
to cultivate the land both parcels should be clear by the next day.  The older son spent 
half of the day clearing the rocks.  Once he finished, he was already a bit tired and the 
task of moving the boulder looked so great that he decided to postpone it to the next 
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day.  The younger son started the day by moving the boulder – it took him half a day 
of hard work to push it out of the parcel’s boundaries.  Once he completed that part of 
his task moving the rocks was more like a rest for him.  Accordingly, he finished 
clearing the parcel in that same day and replaced his father in managing the farm. 
By choosing to advance the HST initiative, the Commission has chosen to 
move the small rocks first.  This strategy begs the question of whether the task of 
moving the big boulders blocking the road to EU corporate income tax integration 
would be feasible at all.  This Article’s strategy, on the other hand, starts with a big 
boulder; it requires more effort and political risk-taking, but it is bound to be more 
rewarding.  
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